## 1NC---Round 7

### 1NC---T

#### TOPICALITY:

#### Interpretation: the 1AC must propose and defend an instance of topical action.

#### The “federal government” means the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition, [https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)](https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)\)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate each of the above words’ requirements of state action.

#### Two impacts:

#### First---FAIRNESS. Non-topical advocacies allow the aff to unilaterally determine negative positions and create an incentive to minimize viable contestation. Debate’s a game---competition precedes pedagogy because it’s a procedural question.

#### Second---CLASH. Open-ended topics make focused research, testing, and innovation impossible. Non-topical advocacies are impossible to predict, which is the foundation of argument interaction. The repetition of limited arguments over the course of a season fosters iterative education and teaches debaters how to anatomize power. Prioritize debate’s potential to forge a techne of argumentative refinement because that’s its only unique benefit.

### 1NC---K

#### Their anti-institutional politics re-entrench the power of capital—viewing the state as an arena of class struggle is necessary to prevent environmental destruction and neoliberal accumulation.

Parenti & Emanuele 15

(Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner?¶ Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into.¶ This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country. There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle.¶ When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it.¶ Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government.¶ We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government.¶ The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue.¶ Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole. More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can.¶ Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month.¶ As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital.¶ I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives?¶ It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems. A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation.¶ You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news.¶ For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this.¶ Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local. On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left.¶ Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources?¶ Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly ~~stand up to~~ rebuff them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated.¶ If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the laws in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable.¶ Part Two:¶ Vincent Emanuele: Much of the green washing, or capitalism’s attempt to brand itself as green, focuses on localism and anti-government, market-driven programs. Do you think this phobia of the state among the US left is a result of previous failed political experiments? How much of this ideology is imposed from outside forces?¶ Christian Parenti: Some state phobia comes from the American political mythology of rugged individualism; some comes from the fundamentally Southern, Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights. Fear of the federal government by Southern elites goes back to the founding of the country. The Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian positions on government are fundamental to understanding American politics. I wrote about this for Jacobin magazine in a piece called "Reading Hamilton from the Left."¶ Lurking just beneath the surface of states’ rights is, of course, plantation rights. Those plantations, places like Monticello, were America’s equivalent of feudal manors where, in a de facto sense, economic, legal and military power were all bound up together and located in the private household of the planter. Those Virginian planters were the original localistas.¶ Nor did that project end with the fall of slavery, or the end of de jure segregation in the 1960s. Southern elites didn’t want Yankees telling them what to do; how to treat their slaves, how to organize their towns, how to run their elections, how to treat the environment – none of that! The South is a resource colony and its regional elites, some of them now running multinational corporations and holding important posts in the US government, believe they have a right to do what they wish with the people and landscape. Historically, that’s a large part of what localism and local democracy meant in the South. It meant that White local elites were "free" – free to push Black people around, free to feed racist fantasies to the White working class. They didn’t want interference from the outside. So, some of that anti-statist ideology comes from that plantation tradition. Another part of it comes from the real failures and crimes of state socialism, though state socialism also had, and in Cuba still has, many successes. The social welfare record of what we used to call "actually existing socialism" was pretty impressive. But there were also the problems of repression, surveillance and bureaucratization, which were partly the result of capitalist encirclement, partly the result of the ideological hubris rooted in ideological overconfidence in the allegedly scientific power of Marxism, partly the result of simple corruption among socialism’s political class. These real problems were central themes in the Cold War West’s educational and ideological apparatus of (generally right-wing) messaging from the press and the political class. In this discourse, communism was the state, while freedom was the private sector. Thus, the United States and freedom became embodied in popular notions of the private sector and individualism.¶ Of course, the great, unmentioned contradiction in this self-fantasy is the fact that American capitalism has always been heavily, heavily dependent on the state. Modern society, despite its fantasies about itself, is intensely cooperative and collective. Look at how complex its physical systems are; that cannot be achieved without massive levels of coordination and collective cooperation, much of it provided by the rules and regulations of government. The knee-jerk anti-statism, what the folks at Jacobin call "anarcho-liberalism," is also rooted in experience. The less social power you have, the more the state is experienced as an invasive, demeaning, oppressive and potentially, very violent bureaucracy. Neoliberalism would not have gotten this far if there wasn’t an element of truth to this critique of its bureaucracy and regulation. It has also used ideas that have old cultural tractions, like freedom.¶ Such are the contradictions of the modern democratic state in capitalist society. Government is rational, supportive, humane, [and offers] redistribution in the form of Social Security, high-quality public schools, environmental regulation, the Voting Rights Act and other federal civil rights laws that have helped break hegemonic power of local and regional bigots. But government is also militarized policing, the bloated prison system, spying on a vast scale; it is child protective services taking children from loving mothers on the basis of bureaucratic traps, corrupt corporate welfare at every level from town government to federal military contracting. The racist, sexist, plutocratic and techno-bureaucratic features of the state create fertile ground for people to turn their backs on the whole idea of government. What has been the impact of the right’s ability to effectively propagandize the White working class in the US?¶ Rightist intellectuals, academics, journalists, media tycoons, university presidents and loudmouth politicians work diligently to capture and form the raw experience of everyday oppression into an ideological common sense. To be clear, I use that term in the Gramscian sense, in which common sense refers to ruling class ideology that is so hegemonic as to be absorbed and naturalized by the people. The constant libertarian assault on the radio, in newspapers, on the television, this drumbeat of anti-government discourse is an old story – but still very important for understanding the anarcho-liberal sensibility. Just tune in to AM radio late on a weekday evening and listen to the anti-government vitriol. It’s sort of wild.¶ Someone could do an interesting study, Ph.D., in unpacking the cultural history of all this. It is tempting to speculate that deindustrialization, having disempowered and made anxious many huge sections of the working class, opens the way for fantasies of empowerment. The anti-statist, rugged individualist common sense is also always simultaneously a fantasy of empowerment. White men are particularly vulnerable to these fantasies. The classic guy who calls into the batshit crazy, late night, right-wing talk radio show is a middle-aged White man. Listen closely to the rage and you hear fantasies of independence. In this rhetoric, guns and gun rights become an obviously phallic symbol of individual empowerment, agency, self worth, responsibility etc. But most importantly, we have to think about how all of this anti-state ideology is being stirred up with investments from elites. The neoliberal project is to transform the state through anti-statist rhetoric and narratives. They sell the idea that people need to be liberated from the state. But then push policies that imprison people while liberating and pampering capital. It is hard for the left to see itself in this sketch – the angry, beaten-down, middle-aged White guy calling in from his basement or garage. But I think these much-documented corporate efforts to build neoliberal consent permeate the entire culture and infect us all, if even just a little bit.¶ This is the intellectually toxic environment in which young activists are approaching the question of the climate emergency. Young activists should be approaching the climate crisis the way the left approached the economic crisis during the Great Depression. We need to drastically restructure the state. We need it mobilized and able to transform the economy. The New Deal was imperfect, of course. It left domestic workers and farm workers out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was inherently racist. It dammed rivers and was environmentally destructive. However, the New Deal was radical in its general empowerment of labor; its distributional outcomes were progressive and it achieved a modernizing transformation of American capitalism. Not to overstate the case, but the New Deal could be a reference point for thinking about the beginning of a green transformation that seeks to euthanize the fossil fuel industry. We have to precipitously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build a new power sector. That much is very clear.¶ However, let me be clear: Shutting down the fossil fuel industry – mitigating the climate crisis – is not a solution for the environmental crisis. Climate change is only one part of the multifaceted environmental crisis. Shutting down the fossil fuel industry would not automatically end overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, habitat loss, toxification of the environment etc. But carbon mitigation is the most immediately pressing issue we face. The science is very clear on this. Climate change is the portion of the overall crisis that must be solved immediately so as to buy time to deal with all the other aspects of the crisis. Because I take the political implications of climate science very seriously, I am something of a carbon fundamentalist.

#### The aff’s opposition to governmentality makes solvency impossible— their politics produce catharsis, but cement capitalist inequality— rejection in favor of institutional focus is key

Smulewicz-Zucker 15 – Professor of Philosophy @ Baruch College CUNY

(Gregory, “The Treason of Intellectual Radicalism and the Collapse of Leftist Politics,” LOGOS, Winter edition)

Radical politics in contemporary western democracies finds itself in a state of crisis. When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is found wanting. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, radical theory has blossomed. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, new journals have emerged touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and sub-fields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts. Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive, meaningful political, social, and cultural criticism of the kind that once made progressive and rational left political discourse relevant to the machinations of real politics and the broader culture. Today, leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity – from the workers movement to the Civil Rights movement – possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles. Quite to the contrary, social movements have lost political momentum, they are generally focused on questions of culture, shallow discussions of class, and are generally obsessed with questions of identity divorced from the questions of material forms of oppression rather than on the great “social question” of unequal distributions of economic and political power which once served as the driving impulse for political, social and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and illusory visions of anarchic democracy, economic inequality has ballooned into oligarchic proportions, working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups are turned into a modern “coolie” labor force. This has been the result, we contend, of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory. Further, we believe that this is the result of a transformation of ideas, that contemporary political theory on the left has witnessed a decisive shift in focus in recent decades – a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age. At a time when the left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, political discourse has become increasingly dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, post-colonialism, and other intellectual fads. This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism, further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power rather than disrupting it. These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose. The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to post-industrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others ought not to be a basic political imperative. To this end, what we would call a rational radical politics should seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics, but rather to enrich common goods, erode the great divisions of wealth and class, democratize all aspects of society and economy, and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community toward common ends. Indeed, only by widening the struggles of labor and re-thinking the ends of the labor movement – connecting the struggles labor to issues beyond the workplace, to education, the environment, public life, issues of racial and gender equality, culture and the nature of the social order more broadly – can we envision a revitalization of a worker’s movement, one that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals.[1] But this is merely one fringe expression of what we see as a corrupted, simplified and de-politicized “new” radicalism. Once grounded in the Enlightenment impulse for progress, equality, rationalism, and the critical confrontation with asymmetrical power relations, the dominant trends of radical political thought now evade the concrete nature of these concerns. The battles that raged in the 1980s and 1990s between postmodernists and defenders of modernity – while serving as a harbinger of the contemporary split between the radical theorists divorced from reality and those who seek to establish anti-foundationalist conceptions of democratic discourse – were attached to a strong sense that the future of rationalism and radical politics hung in the balance. Today’s radical intellectuals do not feel compelled to defend their arguments or respond to their critics. Their purported radicalism becomes all the more opaque when the coherence of their claims is called into question. A concern for an exaggerated subjectivity, identity politics, anti-empirical theories of power, an obsession with “difference” – all serve to deplete the radical tradition of its potency. Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies, invent new forms of “subjectivity,” and concoct new languages of discourse that only serve to splinter forms of political resistance, consigning radicalism to the depths of incoherence and (academic success notwithstanding) political irrelevance. Indeed, the disintegration of the great radical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – from the labor movement to the Civil Rights movement – has detached philosophical thinking from the mechanisms of power and political reality more broadly. The result has been – despite the ironic new turn toward “anti-philosophy” – the conquest of politics by poorly constructed philosophy. Abstraction has been the result, as well as a panoply of shibboleths that have only served to sever “radical” thought from its relevance to contemporary politics and society. It seems to us that the survival of the tradition of rational, radical political and social criticism pivots on a confrontation with these new academic trends and fads.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and causes existential environmental obliteration, global structural violence, and imperial expansion.

Robinson 18 (William, Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Accumulation Crisis and Global Police State,” 2018, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0896920518757054>)

Each major episode of crisis in the world capitalist system has presented the potential for systemic change. Each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts, leading to a restructuring of the system, including new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually result in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. The current crisis shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises, such as of the 1880s, the 1930s or the 1970s. But there are six interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggests that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization – that is, our very survival now requires a revolution against global capitalism (Robinson, 2014). These six dimensions, in broad strokes, present a “big picture” context in which a global police state is emerging.

First, the system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2011; Moore, 2015). These ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under escalating repression as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment. While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature.

Second, the level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented. The richest one percent of humanity in 2016 controlled over half of the world’s wealth and 20 percent controlled 95 percent of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent had to make do with just five percent (Oxfam, 2017). These escalating inequalities fuel capitalism’s chronic problem of overaccumulation: the TCC cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to chronic stagnation in the world economy (see next section). Such extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge of social control to dominant groups. As Trumpism in the United States as well as the rise of far-right and neo-fascist movements in Europe so well illustrate, cooptation also involves the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled towards scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend themselves to projects of 21st century fascism.

Third, the sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated control over the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. Computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunker-buster bombs, a new generation of nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication and symbolic production. If global capitalist crisis leads to a new world war the destruction would simply be unprecedented.

Fourth, we are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion – from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands is turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by the global police state.

#### The alternative is structural socialist analysis and cross-class solidarity around emancipatory anti-capitalist reforms.

Dudzic and Reed 15 – national organizer of the labor party; PhD, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

(Mark and Adolph, “THE CRISIS OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT IN THE UNITED STATES”, November 2015, Socialist Register)

Any serious discussion of the prospects for rebuilding a left must start from the understanding that the left in the US, as in the rest of the capitalist world, suffered a strategic defeat, and that capital has reorganized and emerged from the 2008 economic crisis even stronger.24 While the extreme financialization of capital is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of episodic crises, this crisis once again confirms that there is no necessary correlation between crisis and revitalization of the left. In fact, notwithstanding glimmers of hope like SYRIZA in Greece and strong showings by anti-austerity parties in the spring 2014 European elections, the history of the post-2008 crisis politics in Europe would indicate that the more intense the crisis, the more deeply reactionary the response. This does not mean that those who embrace a transformative vision must abandon all hope. Rather, the priorities, activities and resources of those who would rebuild a real left must be informed by this strategic sensibility. Building or rebuilding an effective left presence will be quite likely a decades-long process. This means that we are not well served by clambering after the Next Big Thing. We must start by excising the impulse – quite understandable for a political movement devoid of any real agency – toward utopian dreaming and wishful thinking. The spark will not ignite the prairie fire. Nor will the Ark float on its own account no matter how carefully we construct it. Recognizing the left’s political irrelevance can be emancipating, as it reduces the sense of urgency to try to mobilize around every one of neoliberalism’s daily outrages. That should provide space for serious strategic discussion of how to begin to build a mass socialist movement based in the working class and the creation of new institutions capable of mobilizing cross-class solidarity, as Sam Gindin has articulated in a particularly clear and compelling way.25 Certainly, the US left could benefit from a nonsectarian, organized force with a coherent strategic vision and programme. The absence of a disciplined, unified and sophisticated group of cadre is a major source of the left’s incoherence, and helps explain why moments of spontaneous political upsurge have had, at best, an episodic impact and remain unconnected to similar moments in the past – even those in which the same activists have participated. Such organization, however, cannot be created in a vacuum. It can only emerge in tandem with a growing working-class movement. We fear that in the specific context of US history and practice, the socialist project is too narrow a platform from which to launch a broad and far ranging left revitalization. Socialist practice in the US has become the domain of sectarian groups that drive away working-class support, and socialist consciousness has not embedded itself in any significant sections of the working class or a left capable of exercising social power. That failing reflects the cultural and ideological triumph of neoliberalism and the identitarian ideologies and programmes that serve as its left wing. In this environment, building socialism is exclusively a project of cadre development, albeit one that cannot hope to succeed apart from broader movement-building. Broad movement-building requires mobilizing around an agenda of substantively anti-capitalist reforms that directly and militantly assert the priority of social needs over market forces, bourgeois property rights and managerial prerogative in the workplace and production process. Struggles to preserve and expand public institutions and to decommoditize basic human needs like housing, transportation, healthcare and education could begin to address the immediate challenge, which is to create a new popular constituency for a revitalized movement, instead of reorganizing or re-mobilizing an already existing but totally marginalized left.26 Some question whether the current US labour movement is too narrow a platform on which to rebuild a left. In a widely circulated article, ‘Fortress Unionism’, Rich Yeselson correctly highlights the atrophy of the labour movement and shows how its decline began with the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947. He contends that labour’s ‘current institutional expression cannot, via a creative conceptual breakthrough (“tactics or broader strategy”), engender a vast growth in union strength comparable to its former peak. In short, “organized labor” can no longer create a space for workers to join their organizations by the millions’.27 In grim statistical detail, Jake Rosenfeld’s What Unions No Longer Do gives fuel to this thesis. He points out that despite decades of exemplary, heroic and pioneering organizing by Justice for Janitors in the immigrant community, ‘Today only one in seven Hispanic janitors in the United States belongs to a union, down from one in five back in 1988, when Justice for Janitors began’.28 Yeselson calls for a ‘fortress unionism’ that would ‘defend the remaining high-density regions, sectors and companies’ and then ‘Wait for the workers to say they have had enough. When they demand in vast numbers collective solutions to their problems, seize upon that energy and institutionalize it.’29 This approach correctly identifies the urgent need to preserve the remnants of the current labour movement as an institutional base upon which to build a future revitalized movement. And it also correctly points out the haplessness of willy-nilly organizing schemes that do little to build power for working people while exposing their best leaders in unorganized workplaces to massive employer retaliation without any ability to defend them. But a strategy of waiting for workers to say they have had enough ultimately relies on magical thinking not unlike that of isolated Japanese soldiers scattered on island outposts at the end of the Second World War waiting for reinforcements from a defeated empire. Many of Yeselson’s critics, however, are equally quixotic. Bruce Raynor and Andy Stern, two of the most cynical practitioners of a unionism that disempowers workers and is based on a model of global class collaboration, point out that the ‘fortress’ strategy will do little to reduce inequality. Instead, they place their hopes in ‘strategic alliances with willing employers’; in unions developing value-added services to complement human resource departments; and in leveraging union and public-sector pension funds to rebuild union density.30 This strategy would liquidate the very concept of an independent labour movement. Given its decimation and marginalization, any revitalization movement would need to be built from a base that is far broader than the current institutional labour movement. A revitalized labour movement will have to embrace new organizational forms and some of the models emerging from new labour organizing show significant potential. Some are driven by necessity as the legal status of many immigrants and of workers in industries such as trucking, taxi driving and residential construction make organizing under current labour law virtually illegal. Much of this new organizing is being done by Worker Centers with heavy foundation funding and has the character of social work along the settlement house model of the early twentieth century. Much of it seems also, more or less openly, to fold class analysis into identitarian discourses that both substitute moralizing for political critique and fit comfortably within the NGO model. Such impulses, as well as the popularity of neologism, underlie arguments that current conditions have generated a new social formation, a ‘precariat’ that lies outside the traditional capitalist class structure.31 But some associated with this category have begun to evolve into substantial, self-conscious worker-run organizations. The Taxi Workers Alliance grew from a small New York City advocacy group to become a national organization (whose members are classified as ‘independent contractors’ and thus ineligible for union representation under US labour law) and was recently admitted to the AFL-CIO.32 In Vermont and elsewhere, strategic Workers Centers have built organic alliances with the labour movement and gone on to lead significant campaigns for healthcare for all, paid sick days and economic justice through the mobilization of a working-class constituency.33 Some argue that these campaigns and projects have the capacity to coalesce into geographically based class-conscious organizations and have called for the building of worker assemblies to give voice to this new movement.34 Such an effort would require a level of ideological sophistication and institutional independence that does not currently exist. Attempts to establish these structures on the ground have been premature and could actually inhibit the kind of broad, class-based organizing that inspires this movement in much the same way that many Labor Party chapters became captured by an ‘activistist’ mentality that focused more on preaching to the converted than building a constituency, while driving away real working-class voices who represented something more than themselves. New models are most successful when they can leverage existing organization and power to build outwards into new organization. Recent experiences organizing healthcare and homecare workers, hotel and casino workers and building services employees are fruitful examples of smart and strategic organizing that have leveraged existing union relationships and/ or political opportunities to build power for working people. We also look to the logistics organizing campaigns – which focus on the chokepoints of global capitalism and build on existing union power on the docks and other shipping centres – as having the potential to develop a particularly powerful form of a strategic union presence in economic sectors at the very core of contemporary capitalism.35

## Case

### 1NC---Market Metaphors

#### Describing debate and anti-black violence as “anti-competitive” reify neoliberalism to conceptualize debate injects neoliberal political ideology into this space

Zuidhof, ’12 (P.W. Zuidhof, Zuidhof is assistant professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, “Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism, pg. 7-11)JM

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life. The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state. The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism. By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221). Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life. The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics. This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

### 1NC---Presumption

#### Vote negative on presumption:

#### 1: No solvency---their K of unfair practices within and outside debate is not tied to an advocacy or method capable of changing these institutions, and the ballot is not necessary for the actualization of the 1AC.

#### 2: Inherency---resolution against whiteness is non-unique---voting affirmative might absolve you of some guilt, but it is not connected to breaking down racial exclusion.

### 1NC---Backlash DA

#### A---Elite backlash.

Wright 17, \*Erik Olin Wright, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. Director of A. E. Havens Center for Social Justice, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (2017, “How to be an Anti-capitalist for the 21st Century”, https://www.redalyc.org/journal/124/12452111002/html/)

Smashing

This is the classic strategic logic of revolutionaries. The rationale goes something like this:

The system is rotten. All efforts to make life tolerable within capitalism will eventually fail. From time to time small reforms that improve the lives of people may be possible when popular forces are strong, but such improvements will always be fragile, vulnerable to attack and reversible. Ultimately it is an illusion that capitalism can be rendered a benign social order in which ordinary people can live flourishing, meaningful lives. At its core, capitalism is unreformable. The only hope is to destroy it, sweep away the rubble and then build an alternative. As the closing words of the early twentieth century song Solidarity Forever proclaim, “We can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old.” The full realization of the emancipatory alternative may be gradual, but the necessary condition for such a gradual transition is a ruptural break in the existing system of power.

But how to do this? How is it possible for anti-capitalist forces to amass sufficient power to destroy capitalism and replace it with a better alternative? This is indeed a daunting task, for the power of dominant classes that makes reform an illusion also blocks the revolutionary goal of a rupture in the system. Anti-capitalist revolutionary theory, informed by the writings of Marx and extended by Lenin, Gramsci and others, offered an attractive argument about how this could take place:

While it is true that much of the time capitalism seems unassailable, it is also a deeply contradictory system, prone to disruptions and crises. Sometimes those crises reach an intensity which makes the system as a whole fragile, vulnerable to challenge. In the strongest versions of the theory, there are even underlying tendencies in the “laws of motion” of capitalism for the intensity of such system-weakening crises to increase over time, so that in the long-term capitalism becomes unsustainable; it destroys its own conditions of existence. But even if there is no systematic tendency for crises to become ever-worse, what can be predicted is that periodically there will be intense capitalist economic crises in which the system becomes vulnerable and ruptures become possible. The problem for a revolutionary party, therefore, is to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity created by such system-level crises to lead a mass mobilization to seize state power, either through elections or through an insurrectionary overthrow of the existing regime. Once in control of the state, the first task is to rapidly refashion the state itself to make it a suitable weapon of ruptural transformation, and then use that power to repress the opposition of the dominant classes and their allies, dismantle the pivotal power structures of capitalism, and build the necessary institutions for the long-term development of an alternative economic system.

In the 20th century, various versions of this general line of reasoning animated the imagination of revolutionaries around the world. Revolutionary Marxism infused struggles with hope and optimism, for it not only provided a potent indictment of the world as it existed, but also provided a plausible scenario for how an emancipatory alternative could be realized. This gave people courage, sustaining the belief that they were on the side of history and that the enormous commitment and sacrifices they were called on to make in their struggles against capitalism had real prospects of eventually succeeding. And sometimes, if rarely, such struggles did culminate in the revolutionary seizure of state power.

The results of such revolutionary seizures of power, however, were never the creation of a democratic, egalitarian, emancipatory alternative to capitalism. While revolutions in the name of socialism and communism did demonstrate that it was possible “to build a new world from the ashes of the old,” and in certain specific ways they may have improved the material conditions of life of most people for a period of time, the evidence of the heroic attempts at rupture in the 20th century is that they do not produce the kind of new world envisioned in revolutionary ideology. It is one thing to burn down old institutions and social structures; it is quite another to build emancipatory new institutions from the ashes.

Why the revolutions of the 20th century never resulted in robust, sustainable human emancipation is, of course, a hotly debated matter. Some people argue that this was just because of the historically specific, unfavorable circumstances of the attempts at system-wide ruptures. Revolutions occurred in economically backward societies, surrounded by powerful enemies. Some argue it was because of strategic errors of the leadership of those revolutions. Others indict the motives of leadership: the leaders that triumphed in the course of these revolutions were motivated by desires for status and power rather than the empowerment and wellbeing of the masses. And still others argue that failure is intrinsic to any attempt at radical rupture in a social system. There are too many moving parts, too much complexity and too many unintended consequences. As a result, attempts at system-rupture will inevitably tend to unravel into such chaos that revolutionary elites, regardless of their motives, will be compelled to resort to pervasive violence and repression to sustain social order. Such violence, in turn, destroys the possibility for a genuinely democratic, participatory process of building a new society.

#### B---Decline causes nationalism and fascism.

Büchs & Koch 19, \*Milena Büchs, Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK, \*\*Max Koch, Faculty of Social Sciences, Socialhögskolan, Lund University, Box 23, 22100 Lund, Sweden. (“Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing”, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715>)

3.2. Implications of rapidly transforming social systems The social practices lens is also useful for thinking about possible wellbeing implications of rapid social change more generally, and a transition away from a growth-based economy specifically. While the concept of social practices inherently implies the possibility of change (with its focus on agency and creativity), it equally strongly highlights the structural aspects of practices which provide stability and orientation. During times of rapid social transitions, social norms and ‘mental infrastructures’ often lag behind, creating disorientation, social conflict, and negative impacts on wellbeing ([Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0060)). Stability of structural dimensions of social practices offers orientation and some extent of predictability of how oneself and other people are likely to act in the future, providing a framework within which flexibility and change are possible. This orienting function of structural dimensions of practices is likely to be an important condition for people to form reasonably stable identities and relationships – key ingredients for wellbeing. Examples from classical and contemporary [sociological and psychological research](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/sociological-research) suggest that different speeds of changing social structures can establish misalignments and disruptions of social practices which can, in turn, negatively influence health and other wellbeing outcomes. For instance, in his classical study, Durkheim presents suicide at least partly as an outcome of a failure of cultural resources to provide meaning and orientation in the context of other, more rapid social changes ([Durkheim, 2006](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0125); [Vega & Rumbaut, 1991: 375](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0455)). This idea also links to Bourdieu’s concept of the “hysteresis effect”. Here, Bourdieu emphasises that, especially during phases of social transition, people’s habitus and “objective” social circumstances can become disjointed: as a result of [hysteresis](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/hysteresis), dispositions can be “out of line with the field and with the ‘collective expectations’ which are constitutive of its normality. This is the case, in particular, when a field undergoes a major crisis and its regularities (even its rules) are profoundly changed” ([Bourdieu, 2000: 160](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0040)). This can contribute to a deterioration of people’s wellbeing as it makes them feel “out of place” or let them be perceived that way, “plung[ing] them deeper into failure” ([Bourdieu, 2000: 161](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0040)) because they cannot make use of new opportunities or are mistreated or socially excluded by others. Empirical research which partly builds on the idea of hysteresis has shown that wide-ranging organisational change can have a range of negative effects on people’s health and mortality ([Ferrie et al., 1998](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0150); [McDonough & Polzer, 2012](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0315)). One study found that across 174 countries, several measures of wellbeing and social performance, including life satisfaction, health, safety and trust, voice and accountability, were highest in periods of economic stability, but lower in times of GDP growth or contraction ([O’Neill, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0355)); and other studies concluded that life expectancy can be negatively affected by both rapid economic growth and contraction ([Notzon et al., 1998](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0345); [Szreter, 1999](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0445)). Several scholars have recently highlighted the potential for social conflict inherent in (rapid) social change. For instance, Maja [Göpel (2016: 49)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0185) remarks: “Unsurprisingly, the navigation or transition phase in shifting paradigms as well as governance solutions is marked by chaos, politicization, unease and power-ridden struggles”. Wolfgang Streeck has issued similar warnings ([Streeck et al., 2016: 169](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0435)). It is not difficult to see how such scenarios bear the potential of undermining some of the fundamental conditions that are necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs as discussed above, and hence the danger of generating substantial wellbeing losses for current and near-future generations. In the current context, it is very difficult to imagine that we might be able to observe a rapid and radical cultural change in which people adopt identities and related lifestyles that value intrinsically motivated activities over pursuing satisfaction and status through careers and consumption. Even more worryingly, political events in Europe, the United States and elsewhere since the ‘Great Crash’ of 2008 indicate that times of negative or stagnant growth can provide a breeding ground for populist, nationalistic and anti-democratic movements. Economic insecurity, a perceived threat of established identities through migrants, and deep mistrust against ‘elite’ politicians are amongst the main explanations for previously unimaginable events such as the [Brexit](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/brexit) vote, Trump presidency, and recent electoral successes for far right-wing parties in a range of European countries.

### 1NC---Political Resistance

#### You should prefer black political resistance over ontological claims that reify anti-blackness and accept the inevitability of violence.

Hortense Spillers 18, An American literary critic, Black Feminist scholar and the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor at Vanderbilt University, August 30th, “Or Else…,” https://alinejournal.com/convergence/or-else//KU-MS

This enormous conceptual legacy, one way or another, accounts, I believe, for the lion’s share of African-American theoretical production and might be said to proffer a rich example of the problem of being/becoming and time. In its impressive variations and combinations, recombinations and iterations, black theory-making has engendered its fullest efflorescence in my view in the post-sixties period with regard to both thematic variedness and complexity and the democratic and demographic distribution of its practitioners; it is also true that any one of these postures and/or variations on it might evince at any given moment a kind of intellectual sclerosis which would induce in turn a conservative politics. If, for example, a theory governed by a diasporic view of black history from which to commence its narrative reifies slavery and colonization as inherent properties in a subject, then the theoretical posture no longer serves as an intellectual technology, or a heuristic device, but, rather, comes to advance an ontological valence. In my own work, for instance, I attempt to advance a theory of flesh/body as a strategy to differentiate historical positionalities in confrontation with the modern world. But if this idea has any usefulness, it proposes the theory as an opening into a closure; a torque that kicks off movement or rotation in static properties. But I should hope not to lose sight of the human potential that the subject of the flesh embodies; perhaps another way to say this is that the enfleshed subject inscribes an opening in a chain of necessity rather than a last word. The theory does not exhaust the subject that it would address, but attempts to highlight it. To hold to the view that the enfleshed subject is actually chattel or property—which we cannot say, insofar as we have merely established a subject possibility in this case—defeats the purpose of discriminating in the first place between a conceptual device on the one hand and a speaking (even if barred) subject on the other.

I have taken, then, the long way around in order to say that the ballot does not lose efficacy when it is wielded by black personality because the latter was once defined as anomie, as chattel. In other words, to premise the future of blackness on its past is to be mired in timelessness, which is precisely to be bereft of historicity, of differentiation, of progression. But moreover, it confuses a conceptual narrative, or a position in discourse, with an actual narrative that will always exceed it. To disparage the black vote is not a sophisticated, or radical, response to anything, but reverberates instead, without meaning to, we might suppose, a long-standing hatred of black people and their aspirations. To express doubt about the vote, especially this election season, in light of what we face now is beyond criticism: it is quite simply to embrace the inevitability of violence, and one should avoid flirtation with violence unless she is willing to put herself in its path. Anything less is an act of bad faith; I would go so far as to say that the failure to cast a vote at the coming midterms is an immoral act for at least two reasons that might go without saying, but bear repeating nonetheless: the meaning of suffrage for generations of African-Americans and the suffering that it has exacted over the decades and the certain danger that the current presidency and a treasonous, complicit Republican congressional majority pose to the United States and the world. Do we need to count the ways that we are doubtless threatened?

### 1NC---Contingency

#### Anti-blackness is mutable.

Kelley, 17—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE>, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

#### Society is shaped by human choices and relationships---ontological notions of racism are littered with contradictions and entrench anti-black racism by accepting failure before even trying to alter power relations.

\*Black people must’ve been humans in the first place to have their humanity denied

\*Afro pessimism relies on white people denying their relation to black people, but one must be in relation to blackness in order to define it

\*don’t allow white people to define social death

\*power is contingent and should be studied instead of assuming ontology

\*they make anti-blackness self-sustaining and non-relational which calcifies historical resistance

\*they assume ontology before it actually occurs

\*we should not make a-priori assertions on reality either way

\*the social world is a manifestation of choices and relationships (human actions) which means it is contingent and can be altered

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There is a simple version of my argument from those years: Racism requires denying the humanity of other groups of human beings through the organization of them, through regimes of power, under the category of a race and then denying the ascription of human being to them. The performative contradiction is that they would first have to be identified as human beings in order to deny their being such. It is thus a form of mauvaise-foi. Since racism is a form of mauvaise-foi, antiblack racism, as a species of racism, must also be a form of mauvaise-foi.

My seemingly simple argument had complicated theoretical consequences. How did such performative contradictions historically emerge? People were not always categorized under races. Gender and linguistic membership predated many racial concepts (Gordon, 1997). Many other examples, such as religious membership, location in an economy, and even specialized skills could be added to the mix.

One approach is to look at the concepts informing dehumanization. They depend on a particular idea of human beings at work in racist practices. An obvious feature of racism is the rejection of having relationships with members of certain races. Non-relationality has many implications. For one, the notion that one could exist without relations with others (a slippery slope leading to being without relations) requires a model of the self as self-sustaining ‘substance’. That model has dominated much of market-oriented Euromodern thought, especially those in the Anglophone world. My writings could be read as a critique of this notion. Consider any act of studying a phenomenon. Such an effort cannot be done without establishing at least a relationship with something as a focus of study. This doesn’t involve eliminating one’s relationship to reality but instead reorienting oneself to relevant acts of knowing, learning, and understanding (Gordon, 1995, 2010, 2012, 2016). Commitment to the elimination of relations leads to contradictions. Try, for instance, eliminating relations to oneself. Mauvaise foi returns in many forms as each displeasing truth about relations is denied for the sake of pleasing falsehoods. In the chain of efforts, other important elements of study such as communicability, evidence, and sociality come to the fore, each of which raises concerns of the self as other.

As I focused primarily on antiblack racism, the question of whether all other forms of racism are the same emerged. Blackness functions, after all, in peculiar ways in societies that have produced antiblack racism. A response to the #BlackLivesMatter movement, for instance, is often that ‘all lives matter’. That is true the extent to which each group lives under conditions of equal respect for life. What advocates of #BlackLivesMatter are doing, however, is responding to a world in which some lives matter a lot more than others, whose lives evidentially matter a lot less. The history of antiblack racism amounts to the conviction that black people are only valuable the extent to which there is use for their labor or, worse, profiting from their misfortune as we see with the heavily racialized prison industrial complexes in the United States and similar countries (Alexander, 2010; Davis, 1983, 2005). It collapses into the expectation of justified existence in a context in which the justification for whoever stands as most valued is intrinsic. Members of the dominant group could thus seek their justification – if they wish – personally, through mechanisms of love, professional recognition, athletic achievement, etc. Moreover, that such society renders some groups as positive and others as negative leads to notions of legitimate presence (illegitimate absence) and absence (illegitimate presence). Should the analysis remain at white and black, the world would, however, appear more closed than it in fact is. For one, simply being born black would bar the possibility of any legitimate appearance. This is a position that has been taken by a growing group of theorists known as ‘Afropessimists’, for whom ‘black’ signifies absolute ‘social death’ (Sexton, 2010, 2011; Wilderson, 2007, 2008, 2009). It is, in other words, outside of relations. My objections to this view are many. For one, no human being is ‘really’ any of these things. Do blacks, for instance, suffer social death in relation to each other? The project of making people into such is one thing. The achievement of such is another. This is an observation Fanon also makes in his formulation of the zone of nonbeing and his critique of otherness in the study of race in Black Skin, White Masks, which I discuss at length my (Gordon, 2015) study, What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought.

Fanon (1952) is critical of how otherness is interpreted in race theories and the study of race. The rejection of otherness ignores the fact that others are human beings. Racism emerges in attempts to deny that. Instead, it offers the zone of nonbeing, non-appearance as human beings. The racially dominant group presumes self-justified reality (license), which means it doesn’t call itself into question. And the designated racially inferior group? Lacking justification, their access to being is illegitimate. This means their absence is a mark of the system’s legitimacy. Such groups face the Catch 22 of illegitimate appearance: To appear is to violate appearance. Put differently, the violation is one of appearing without a license to do such. To all this, a consideration that should be added is this: The human being comes to the fore through emerging from being in the first place. Thus, the assertion of Being, as in the thought of Heidegger and his followers is also an effort to push the human being out of existence, so to speak. Heidegger, fair enough in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947/1971), saw no problem in this. Fanon (1952), and many others in Africana philosophy, including the South African philosopher and psychologist Noël Chabani Manganyi (1973, 1977), disagreed through showing how racial conflict is also an existential one in which an existential ontology is posed against an ontology of being. The latter, we submit, is best suited for gods. When such becomes the model of being human, humanity dies. Blacks thus face the paradox of existing (standing out, living – as ex sistere means such) as non-existence (not standing out). Antiblack racism makes black appearance illicit.

Licit appearance would mean appearing as selves and others. It would mean the right to appear. Antiracist struggles will not work, then, as a struggle against otherness. It is, instead, against being non-selves and non-others.

Returning to the Afropessmistic notion of blackness as social death, I’m compelled to ask: Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count as social perspectives? If the question of racism is a function of unequal power, which it clearly is, why not offer a study of power, how it is gained and lost, instead of an assertion of its manifestations as ontological?

I’m reminded here of Victor Anderson’s (1995) Beyond Ontological Blackness. Anderson would no doubt object that Afropessimism treats ‘blackness’ as an ontological, which makes it a self-sustaining (non-relational) concept. The historical emergence of blackness refutes that. But more, there is a logical paradox that emerges from ontological blackness. To identify blackness, one must be in a relation to it. This relational matter requires looking beyond blackness ironically in order to understand blackness. This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, and fixed into the grammar of how meaning is produced.

Consider the grammar of gender. Women historically occupy the role of absence (de Beauvoir, 1949; Butler, 2011; Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997). Blackness and womanness are thus intimate (Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997). The grammar of presence and absence is peculiarly theodicean (Gordon, 2010, 2013). This is the form of mauvaise-foi in which presence takes on the hubris of the desire to be a (often the) god. Theodicy defends the integrity of the god (systemic maintenance) through placing its contradictions (for example, evil) outside of it. The result is Being as a form of systemic purity (Monahan, 2011, 2017). This grammar is also psychoanalytical, in the sense of existential psychoanalysis. Manichean ‘qualities’ (such as ‘hard’ masculinity and ‘soft’ femininity) are evident in these modes of being. This pertains as well to sexual orientation: A white man’s relation to a black man is not only one of race-to-race but also of race-to-gender where the meaning of being black (as ‘feminine’ and ‘sexual’) could collapse into gendered absence. And extended to the sexualization of absence – think of the plethora of literature on the feminine as soft, cold, dark, and absence. The relation among males in which one group manifests such qualities immediately collapses into a homoerotic one (Fanon, 1952; Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997, 2000).

We see here a conception of dealing with racial and gender qualities that are today called ‘intersectional’, though that metaphor doesn’t at first quite work for their existential phenomenological psychoanalytical manifestations in mauvaise-foi (because purity seeks singularity). The major proponent of intersectionality – Kimberlé Crenshaw – is pretty clear that she is referring to identity collisions as they appear in law (especially tort and discrimination law); in other words, she is referring to harms that, because of how they are interpreted, don’t appear (supposedly don’t exist) despite their lived-reality. She often illustrates her point through her famous example of a collision at a four-way intersection (Crenshaw, 1991, 2014). If the fundamental site of harm is property, the concern will be about the cars, and if their status of property depends on being owned by, say, white men, then harm would pertain to them. If the location of harm expands simply to ‘whites’, then a white woman or man in one of the cars would be sufficient for harm having occurred. If, however, there were no whites in the cars, then the conclusion would be that no one was harmed. If harm extends to blacks and other people of color, and even further, to non-human animals, then any of them being in the car or cars would initiate a cause for redress. Notice that Crenshaw’s argument doesn’t deny the possibility of white men being harmed. Her point is that people such as black women were not historically acknowledged in the legal frameworks of harmed subjects because of a failure to see that human beings do not manifest a single category of identity on which to build a legal response. Simply referring to ‘man’ as the exemplar of human being fails to acknowledge that human beings are not only men but also women, and simply as ‘women’ fails to address what kind of women such as those of color and different sexual orientations.

At an existential level, what is also missed is the lived-reality of the convergence of these and their social and legal implications. A black woman in an automobile collision is, for example, not just harmed but also harmed in ways linked to the wider legal framework of the society. The criminalization of black women and men, for instance, could mean that though harmed in the collision, such people may face the possibility of entanglement in a legal system that treats them as the cause of harm, which could lead to other dangers such as ensnarement in the criminal justice system. This is one of the reasons why, even when harmed, many people of color don’t seek the aid of law enforcement and other representatives of that system. Crenshaw’s theory therefore has an existential and phenomenological significance in that it is an argument for the appearance of what is otherwise treated as either non-existent or not worthy of appearing, of, that is, illicit appearance. Her theory is also about the radicalization of appearance in that the identified subjects emerge, so to speak, not only in terms of being seen but also through an effort to see what they see or experience – in short, to see or at least understand their point of view in terms of the conditions they face. It is thus not a subjective theory or a narrowly objective one but instead an intersubjective theory because it requires understanding how different human beings relate to and encounter legal structures – products of the human world – as simultaneously alienating and enabling.

Crenshaw’s concept of an intersection could, however, be interpreted in problematic ways. The first is the geometric model of an intersection. That version presupposes well-formed or complete lines converging. A response would be that there was never a complete ‘whole’ or, as the feminist phenomenological communicologist Sara Ahmed (2006) would put it, ‘straight line’ with regard to human subjects in the first place. The queer phenomenological theorist David Ross Fryer (2008), in stream with Ahmed, offers the logical conclusion of this critique – namely, a fundamental queerness at the heart of race theory and related areas of study such as gender studies and queer theory. My recent work in philosophy of culture extends such a concern to the human condition as well – that is, the upsurge from being makes human reality a queer one. This is pretty much the argument articulated earlier with regard to questions raised by Fanon’s analysis of ontology, existential ontology, and the dialectics of selves and others.

The second critical consideration is that as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning, the question of identity requires more than an intersecting model, otherwise there will simply be one (a priori) normative outcome in every moment of inquiry: Whoever manifests the maximum manifestation of predetermined negative intersecting terms. That would in effect be an essence before an existence – indeed, before an actual event of harm. Some race theorists’ tendency to build their arguments on a particular group as ‘most oppressed’ without offering evidence for the continued truth of such a claim is an example of this fallacy. This observation emerges as well where pessimism is the guiding attitude. An existential critique would be that optimism and pessimism are symptomatic of the same attitude: a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental, which means that the social world at hand is a manifestation of choices and relationships – in other words, human actions. As human beings can only build the future instead of it determining us, the task at hand depends on commitment – what is to be done without guarantees of outcome. This concern also pertains to the initial concerns about authenticity. One could only be pessimistic about an outcome, an activity. It’s an act of forecasting what could only be meaningful once actually performed. Similarly, one could only be optimistic about the same. What, however, if there were no way to know either? Here we come to the foi element in mauvaise foi. Some actions are deontological, and if not that, they are at least reflections of our commitments, our projects. Thus, the point of some actions isn’t about their success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing (Fanon, 1961/ 1991; Gordon, 2015). Taking responsibility for such actions – bringing value to them – is opposed to another manifestation of mauvaise-foi: the spirit of seriousness.

# 2NC

## T

### 2NC---Overview

#### Debate is a competitive activity structured by fairness---any alternative account must explain why there must be a winner and loser, why clipping is categorically rejected, OR why the 2AR will try to convince you that they won on tech.

#### They themselves have demonstrated these competitive incentives ()

---not disclosing the substance of the aff

---saturating the 1AC with T and cap preempts

---OR calling for a ballot as the end goal of their revolution

---they have read a plan all year long.

#### All of this should demonstrate a disconnect between voting for (Wake) and (breaking down racial capitalism), because (the drive to win a ballot overdetermines their radicalism of their project)---this uniqueness claim has two implications:

#### a---presumption---voting aff doesn’t endorse [abolishing white finance], it endorses their deployment of it as a means to a ballot, rinse and repeat. That has no capacity to catalyze change, proven by them winning and losing multiple times and the contours of (racism) remaining unchanged.

#### Disregard offense the ballot doesn’t solve because you can vote neg while agreeing those things are bad.

#### b---controls their offense---the aff won’t change minds or norms because their opponents will interpret losses as technical referendums, and their judges will coach other teams on how to better answer it immediately after voting aff.

#### Last argument before I get into the line-by-line---they can’t just win the aff is good. They have to win debating about it is good.

#### The 1AR must answer the question: why the neg should have to say no to the aff?

### 2NC---Interp

#### Topical plans must defend federal antitrust reform---the terms “USfg” and “core antitrust laws” require government change, which the 1AC explicitly disavowed---that’s US Legal and Kimmel.

### 2NC---AT CI---Toolbox

#### [They don’t meet it]

#### a---links to their offense because [it excludes certain affs/if it excludes policy affs, it magnifies unpredictability offense. If it doesn’t, they don’t solve their DAs]. Counter-interps are unconditional.

#### b---doesn’t solve our offense.

#### ONE---predictable limits---[CI] isn’t a functional constraint. It includes affs with a tangential connection to the topic: set col, afro-pess, queer theory, disability studies, racial cap, Deleuze, Marx, any one of a billion other wildly different critical perspectives, clever heg affs with pre-empts, OR any permutation of these.

#### Quality neg prep hinges on a manageable research burden---topicality establishes a sufficiently tight web of neg arguments which the season is spent developing of INSTEAD of exploring a galaxy of them at the surface level.

#### TWO---[arbitrariness/it isn’t resolutional]. That’s unpredictable and infinitely regressive because the rez is the only objective stasis point for discussion. It was proposed, voted on, and announced in advance, whereas under the CI we only find out what the subject of the debate is 40 minutes before start team. Non-resolutional interps mean the aff could functionally change their CI every debate, which nukes the topic.

#### THREE---ground---the resolution is flawed on purpose. Antitrust isn’t a panacea, that’s the point, because state reforms give the other team things to say. This deprives the neg of core topic DAs like innovation, trade-off, or politics, advantage CPs, but also K links, like kritiks of competition, classic economics, or state reform. AND given the overview, they create strategic incentives to defend nothing more than nonfalsifiable truisms like “racism bad,” which justifies affs the neg obviously can’t answer. OR they could point our problems without prescribing a solution, which evacuates the controversy from debate since the best offense stems from praxis.

#### In-depth argument interaction is impossible if the only thing the neg has to say is “talking about identity = extinction.”

#### FOUR---

#### Now, there are [2/3] terminals to the above internal links:

#### [INSERT IMPACTS]

### AT CI---Resolved

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

### AT CI---Prohibit

**Prohibition requires banning a practice by law; that’s distinct from a mere hindrance**

**Van Eaton** et al **17** (Joseph Van Eaton, Gail Karish Gerard Lavery Lederer, lawyers for BEST BEST & KRIEGER, LLP. Michael Watza, KITCH DRUTCHAS WAGNER VALITUTTI & SHERBROOK, “BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C”, COMMENTS OF SMART COMMUNITIES SITING COALITION, March 8, 2017 , https://tellusventure.com/downloads/policy/fcc\_row/smart\_communities\_siting\_coaltion\_comments\_mobilitie\_8mar2017.pdf)

2. What are at issue legally are prohibitions and effective prohibitions, and not hindrances, as the Commission seems to suggest in its Notice. The term “prohibit” is not defined in the Act, but it has an ordinary meaning: to formally forbid (something) by law, rule, or other authority; or to “prevent, stop, rule out, preclude, make impossible.” A mere “hindrance” “is simply not **in accord with** the ordinaryand fairmeaning” ofthe termprohibit,104 and can provide no basis for additional Commission intrusions on local authority over wireless facilities. Much of what Mobilitie complains about is a “hindrance” at most (and usually a hindrance magnified by its own actions).

### Interp---Antitrust

#### “Antitrust” is law enforcement handled by the DoJ or FTC.

Bovard 21, senior director of policy at the Conservative Partnership Institute. She is the co-author of Conservative: Knowing What To Keep with former Senator Jim DeMint and a member of the TAC advisory board. (Rachel, “Why Republicans Must Rethink Antitrust,” *The American Conservative*, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-republicans-must-rethink-antitrust/>)

Accomplishing any of this, however, requires the right to rethink its reflexive hesitance to take action. This is especially true in the area of antitrust. Too many on the right conflate antitrust enforcement with regulation, when the two are quite distinct. Antitrust is targeted law enforcement. It addresses specific acts of marketplace conduct that must be thoroughly investigated by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, and proven before a judge, before the law is enforced. Regulation, by contrast, goes after entire sectors of the economy with a one-size-fits-all approach, and does so without necessarily concerning itself with finding clear evidence of fault.

### Interp

#### “Expand” requires a change in the law.

Hatter 90, District Judge. (Hatter, Opinion in In re Eastport Associates, 114 BR 686 - Dist. Court, CD California 1990. Google scholar caselaw. Date Accessed: 7-12-2021)

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that "[t]he bill would expand the definition of development moratorium." Senate Bill 186, Stats.1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal. App.3d 15, 22, 239 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term "expand" indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### That must be a material modification of the language of the statute.

Iowa Supreme Court 4, Justice (Cady, Opinion in State v. Truesdell, 679 NW 2d 611 - Iowa: Supreme Court 2004. Google scholar caselaw, Accessed: 9-13-2021)

Generally, a material modification of the language of a statute gives rise to "a presumption that a change in the law was intended." Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002); see 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 22.1, at 240-41 (6th ed.2002). The existence of this presumption is enhanced "when the amendment follows a contrary... judicial interpretation of an unambiguous statute." Midwest Auto. III, LLC, 646 N.W.2d at 425.

#### “Antitrust laws” AND “prohibitions” are statutory

Kalbfleisch 61, District Judge. (Kalbfleisch, Opinion in Paul M. Harrod Company v. AB Dick Company, 194 F. Supp. 502 - Dist. Court, ND Ohio 1961. Google scholar caselaw, Accessed: 9-11-2021)

The definition of "antitrust laws" in 15 U.S.C.A. § 12, clearly embraces only the statutes described therein. Even without such a definition the term "antitrust laws" could not be construed as pertaining to a judgment or decree entered by a court in connection with an antitrust case filed by the Government. Such decrees do not necessarily reflect the prohibitions of the antitrust laws but may, by their terms, seek to dissipate the effects of the past conduct of the parties and, to this end, frequently enjoin performance of acts lawful in themselves. To permit a private party to recover damages for violation of any provision of such a decree is so obviously beyond the scope of the term "antitrust laws," as used in the statute, as to require no further discussion.

### 2NC---!---Fairness

#### FAIRNESS:

#### Winning and losing should be a function of evidence familiarity, pretournament prep, and skill. The above analysis proves they disconnect success from those factors and stacks the deck for one side. The aff can unilaterally set a value system for the debate and decide the role of the ballot is to reward who has better presented some truth claim that coheres around their theory of how society operates---it makes it literally impossible to be neg because they get to speak first, decide the value system, and dictate the terms for the debate.

#### Fairness outweighs. It’s intrinsic, two reasons:

#### 1---every interaction in this space depends on competitive neutrality---the fact you’re currently trying to constrain your bias, are flowing my speech, and vote for args you don’t personally believe proves you are predicating your approach to debate on the fair resolution of arguments. If you conclude fair debates are bad because the aff made that argument, you are doing so under the assumption that your position as a judge is to fairly determine a conclusion based only on what we have said. It’s MORE unfair to vote neg to vote aff, which proves responses to this impact are a performative contradiction.

#### 2---everyone comes to debate for different reasons, but they compete because they think they can win. Knowing the aff can shift out of research deletes the strongest incentive for card-cutting or travel. The fact you and both teams have sacrificed hundreds of hours and weekends to illustrates that there is enormous subjective value to participation, which fairness preconditions.

### \*\*[TVA] 2NC---!---Clash

#### CLASH:

#### Allowing the AFF to develop perfect strategies and monopolize ground obviates the purpose of debate by denying the role of the negative.

#### Two impacts:

#### 1---ITERATIVE EDUCATION: it’s intrinsic. Focused debates over the same core controversy teach us how to adapt our positions to be more defendable, which generates a second level of nuance. Contestation outweighs because it’s debate’s only unique benefit---other forums like lectures or advocacy groups should be viewed as CPs that solve their offense, but not ours

#### Topical debates make debaters more effective researchers of (racial cap) because they have to do a deep dive on applying the theory in extremely specific scenarios, instead of generic examples

#### I’ll do the TVA here because it illustrates how the process of iteration solves the aff better.

#### TVAs:

#### You could use antitrust law to:

#### ---dissolve fossil fuel corporations that pollute black/indigenous communities and argue the oil industry’s history of irredeemable racism warrants dismembering it

#### ---stop white corporations from crowding out black and indigenous business ownership, then defend intergenerational wealth creation as a means of countering impoverishment

#### ---dissolve every business in existence, instantly ending capitalism and generating a new economic system---then leverage Ks of economic rationalism to beat the core assumptions of DAs

#### ---ban debt collection companies or loan sharks that target low-income neighborhoods of color with predatory financial schemes

#### Their Roy ev says:

Feminist struggle requires the disinheritance of whiteness. This in turn requires the undoing of property

#### These options both rupture the way debate AND the government currently think about antitrust AND don’t rely on the (racist economic assumptions) they’ve criticized

#### A TVA doesn’t have to solve the aff, just demonstrate that their discussion could occur under topical action. They’ll win there are problems with it, but that’s called neg ground!

#### These options would facilitate season-long clash. Round 1 of Northwestern, the aff reads a plan that bans the fossil fuel industry with an impact out the toxification of black neighborhoods and indigenous land. The neg reads a K of (the cyclical nature of environmental racism) and says the courts would circumvent. The next tournament, the aff adds a plank that mandates court enforcement---the neg adapts by saying industries could move to the Global South---the aff responds at the next tournament with an extraterritorial plantext---by the NDT the aff AND neg have exhausted all possible mechanisms by which (racial cap) could be contingently impacted---BUT in their topic, people just read the same version the whole season because there’s no incentive to innovate

#### 2---ANATOMIZING POWER. In-depth debates about the resolutional mechanism build legal masonry by encouraging debaters to trace the mechanisms of political oppression. Deep knowledge about the actors and influences that shape antitrust policy is valuable because the federal government is a key conduit of injustice. Building power and scholarship for revolutionary praxis requires intricate study of the government, including understanding how and why it regulates the private sector. If you want to be a better researcher, scholar, advocate, or revolutionary, mechanism education is key---they forgo that because they encourage wholesale withdrawal from the topic and sweeping critiques instead of legal analysis.

#### I’ll do switch-side here---reading the aff as a K solves. Flipping sides doesn’t require endorsing the USfg---aff/neg is a pairing, not an identity, and a plan is a temporary advocacy.

# 1NR---Round 7

## Case

### 1NR---Market Metaphors

#### The market metaphors turn---the 1AC describes its method as being “resolved in the face of these financializing processes to abolish the anticompetitive business practices of white being.” The 2AC Miller evidence defines “Racial discrimination” as “a form of cartel behavior.” The neoliberal frame of reference that permeates the 1AC replicates the linguistic codes of whiteness that they claim to resist---that’s 1NC Zuidhoff.

#### The impact is subject-formation---they train abolitionists who view the causes of whiteness as market concentration and anti-competitive strategies, who view the consequences of whiteness in terms of their harm to economic productivity and innovation, and who view the solutions to whiteness in terms of market intervention.

#### It turns the affirmative---even if abolition could be good, they have allowed their method to be colonized by and for neoliberalism in order to make their arguments palatable to the rhetoric of the resolution that they say upholds discursive whiteness---proves that voting affirmative allows whiteness to continue its shiftiness.

### 1NR---Presumption

#### Fatalistic advocacy empowers conservative academic and political forces.

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Contrary to idealized images depicting the pre-revolutionary Russian countryside as one of arcadian tranquillity, a pastoral inhabited by landlords co-existing happily with an unchanging/undifferentiated and subsistence-oriented peasantry, evidence suggests it was a context of acute class struggle, where capitalist producers, buying/leasing rural property from landlords, had already emerged from among the rich peasant stratum. Marxist theory about the connection between agrarian struggle and systemic transition, formulated by — among many others — Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and Preobrashensky, warned against the folly of regarding the peasantry as undifferentiated in class terms, since this would hide within its ranks a powerful rich stratum, which would oppose all attempts to collectivize agricultural production, to introduce or consolidate redistributive taxation, and any further socialization of landholdings. When marking — not celebrating — the 1917 Russian Revolution, therefore, it is in a sense unsurprising that conservatives have been and are vehemently opposed to the advocacy by leftists of revolutionary agency: what is surprising, however, is that among progressives and some leftists this kind of direct action is also viewed negatively, and dismissed as unfeasible. Such an approach emerges currently in the tendency to perceive the Russian Revolution as mainly or only as a cultural phenomenon. The issue is not about regarding culture as a positive outcome of the revolution — which it undoubtedly was — but rather seeing it as the only worthwhile legacy of 1917, almost a way of avoiding other equally important aspects of the revolutionary process, especially politics. It is difficult not to see this as a process of political deradicalization, in which some on the contemporary left have unwittingly participated, and in some instances even supported. Part of the reason for this, it is suggested here, has to do with the fact that critiques of capitalism entailing a socialist transition were replaced in post-1980s academia by endorsements of the “new” populist postmodernism, a form of anti-capitalism which eschews systemic transcendence, and is thus politically less threatening. The political implications of the postmodern “cultural turn” for Marxist theory and practice in the academy are not difficult to discern. To begin with, those on the left who abandoned Marxism for the “new” populist postmodernism ended up fighting the wrong battle: for ethnic “otherness” and national culture, rather than for class and internationalism. Consequently, populism became the theoretically dominant framework in the social sciences, and its counterpart — “resistance” by individuals or by “new” social movements — replaced revolution as the radical practice of choice. Hence the depoliticization of political discourse within the university system as a result of what might be termed the institutional “domestication” of Marxist theory and practice. Accordingly, the situation is not so much an abandonment of first principles as not knowing any longer what these are or might be. The resulting focus on non-class identities (age, gender, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality) as “subversive” foci of resistance by “new” social movements overlooks two crucial points. Where these contribute to the accumulation process, both resistance and empowerment based on identities other than class have been and are encouraged by capital. Consequently, in most instances empowerment and emancipation linked to non-class identity can be achieved as much under capitalism as under socialism. More worryingly, the influence of the “cultural turn” now extends well beyond academics debating rural development in Third World countries, and currently has an impact on politics in metropolitan capitalist Europe and America. Insofar as it privileges cultural identity as empowering, therefore, postmodern theory is complicit with the kind of nationalist ideology represented by populists such as Farage, Le Pen and Trump. All the latter feed off laissez-faire accumulation where economic crisis — generating both an expanding industrial reserve army of migrant labor and also more intense competition, among capitalists themselves and among workers seeking employment — results inexorably in political crisis. To the postmodern argument emphasizing the cultural identity of the migrant-as-“other”-nationality, the far right populist counterposes an argument similarly emphasizing cultural identity, only this time the nationality of the non-migrant worker (= British, French or American “selfhood”). In the absence of socialist ideas and practice, and as capitalism spreads across the globe, this form of nationalist discourse can be deployed effectively by populists who claim it is the only way to safeguard/retain workers’ jobs and living standards. Ominously, therefore, just as many on the left of the political spectrum moved rightwards, abandoning core beliefs (socialism, class, revolution) and espousing postmodern notions of non-class identity as innate and empowering, so the far right has in turn moved onto the political ground they vacated, incorporating class identity into its own ideology.

### 1NR---Whiteness

#### No examples of political movements or strategies that emerge from their method of politics---don’t give them their theorization in the abstract---defer to the specificity and examples given by the neg:

State level legalization of marijuana has occurred because of decriminalization movements like black lives matter

Black women have won court victories for Reproductive justice and increased abortion rights

Local school discipline policies have been rolled back because of protests

#### Modern anti-blackness is mostly determined by institutional and economic discrimination, not libidinal drives. The alternative is the best way to address black suffering.

Cedric Johnson 16, Associate Professor of African American Studies at the University of Illinois-Chicago, 2/3/16, “An Open Letter to Ta-Nehisi Coates and the Liberals Who Love Him,” <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/ta-nehisi-coates-case-for-reparations-bernie-sanders-racism/>

**Italics in original**

Ultimately, the historical narrative that underpins the reparations claim, a view of history that emphasizes racial conflict as primary, white supremacy as hegemonic and immutable, and black politics as insular and unitary, can only leave us with a fatalistic view of political possibilities that neglects the rich, diverse history of interracial left political struggle.

Contrary to the arguments offered by Coates and others, interracial social movements, universal social policy, and an expanded public sector created the contemporary black middle class as we know it.

Even as the slogan of white supremacy united various reactionary Southern elements and restored the power of the merchant-landlord class, interracial organizations fought to secure black freedom and create greater equality for black and white workers. The Readjuster Party in Virginia worked to unite workers against landed interests, and pressed for debt relief, lowered property taxes on farmers, chartered unions, established a black college, expanded public services, and removed the poll tax.

Other organizations at the end of the nineteenth century posed a different interracial, left vision of American society — organizations like the Populist Party of the 1890s, the Knights of Labor, and the Citizens Committee of New Orleans.

Throughout the twentieth century, struggles to expand labor rights, universal suffrage, and civil rights, and to abolish inequality, drew together diverse publics, creating concrete forms of social justice (albeit sometimes short-lived and imperfect). Whites who realized that their fates were intimately connected to those of southern blacks supported struggles against racism.

Jim Crow segregation — the historical system of racial apartheid that was legitimated at the federal level by Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine in 1896, codified by the states, and strictly enforced through violence and intimidation — began a long but certain death after the Second World War. While contemporary forms of inequality in wealth, housing, schooling, and criminal justice may bear a strong resemblance to Jim Crow, these injustices are classed in ways that the ascriptive status of blacks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were not.

Contemporary forms of oppression are not propelled by the need to subjugate black labor to the interests of Southern planters and industrialists, but as a means of managing a growing class of Americans who are not exclusively black but have been made obsolete by hyper-industrialization, the large-scale introduction of automation and cybernetic command, just-in-time production, and other strategies of flexible accumulation in US farms and factories.

We continue to reach for old modes of analysis in the face of a changed world, one where blackness is still derogated but anti-black racism is not the principal determinant of material conditions and economic mobility for many African Americans.

#### Their framing operates as an excuse for inaction.

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Moving left of center, there are varieties of the left. The initial movement is premised on freedom as a condition of human life. Freedom is in tension, however, with liberty. In this direction, the question is how far is one willing to go for freedom. For some, the direction must be as radical as possible, and that path leads not only to anarchy but also to license. Anarchy requires the absence of an externally imposed order. For some anarchists, that means the absence of the sovereign, especially as manifested in the state. For others, there should be a sovereignty of “the people” over the state. Radical democracy, in this view, is anarchy. Short of being a god, being able to do whatever one wants without constrains proves to be juvenile. Children, after all, act with limited responsibility. Maturity requires accountability to others, and that includes political responsibility. In this view, freedom requires building human institutions whose purpose is the cultivation of humane ways of life. This left, then, is against capitalism because of its subordination instead of emancipation of human agency. In other words, human beings should control economies — which are human institutions — instead of being governed by dehumanized abstractions such as capital. From this point of view, the question about states is not whether they should exist but instead that of which kinds to have. States, in other words, need not be dehumanizing. People taking responsibility for their institutions of power could produce democratically infused states Anarchy, however, faces a double-edged sword. On the one hand, there can be anti-capitalist anarchists. They would argue for economies without property and other abstract modes of excluding material resources from other human beings. On the other, there could be — and historically are — pro-capitalist anarchists, whose position is that states should not intervene in societal affairs, which for them includes the market. Their goal is the promotion of capitalism and stateless societies. That second kind of anarchist would collapse into dependency on individual abilities and sheer will in some cases and on consolidation of their groups versus others where collective interests are threatened. Anarchy in this form is no guarantee against collapsing into the right. The emergence of the libertarian right in countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States is a case in point. This portrait of various lefts reveals shifting relationships of left and right. Liberalism is to the right of the Marxist and anarchic lefts. Those lefts are not the entire story, however, since in some countries, such as Australia, Canada, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, a clear mark of being on the right is one’s stand on race and racism. This mixes up these categories. Commitment to the liberation of racially subordinated groups may push one leftward despite having conservative positions on order, which would be to the right. There are members of the left whose class reductionism makes them antipathetic to addressing race. The consequence is an attitude to race with results similar to liberal and neoliberal approaches: denial, diminution, and erasure. To all this, we should also consider the impact of “postmodernism” on leftwing thought. Despite its proponents often locating themselves on the left, many postmodern views of politics are actually conservative. For instance, where power is only “coercive” (power-over-others), it offers no positive possibility. Yet politics demands doing something. Without power, there is nothing one can do. Meditations on power demands exploring its potential beyond actions devoted to its elimination. A way in which politics has been commodified is the assertion of political subjectivity as moral offerings in a “market” of limited recognition. The result is moralism, where the ability to articulate the self or one’s group as a greater moral imperative than others leads to hierarchies of suffering. A slippery slope from suffering to the dismissal of other kinds as adulterated leads to legitimacy as purified misery. The appeal to innocence becomes the model, which unfortunately requires the misguided notion of agency as blame. Put differently, power becomes intrinsically that which “corrupts.” It thus must be abdicated, which requires the paradox of claimed initial absence. How, in other words, could one give up power through claiming never to have had it? The paradox is immobilizing. Yet the question of why, then, isn’t moral identities or admittedly moral claims offered instead of the avowed presentations of them as political emerges. After all, where power in politics is abdicated, only moral declarations remain. An answer, no doubt among others that could be offered, is the impact of market colonization not only of life but also the ways in which it could defend itself against the market. This includes political life. In short, the commodification of politics short-circuits its power while selling its lure. In effect, where politics becomes marketable, it can sell itself the extent to which it doesn’t threaten the approach to markets that make it possible. Capitalism’s intimate relationship with liberalism has always been the assertion of morality over politics, and thus the model of politics as applied morality follows. We return, then, to the distinction between the logic of the right and that of the left with some irony. The right looks to an idealized and idolized past. The left looks to the future for possibilities, but some members of the avowed left may seek a future premised upon an idolized past. In those cases, the left slides into a paradoxical right despite public avowal against the right. An effect of this performative contradiction is political nihilism. Social transformation of political problems in political terms falls sway to the rejection — by virtue of the dismissal of power — of political solutions as viable options. Ruled out of a better future is the idea of a different one than the stuff of our imagination. We should bear in mind, however, that if the future could not be otherwise, contingency in political action would be lost. We come now to the global realities of today. The right hijacked the thinking and practice of the global while many on the left have, in addition to waging protest, either remained locked in the language of stale internationalism or retreated to the solace of re-entrenched localism. This is an unfortunate development of the continued reductive thinking and a lack of imagination. Rightwing, liberal, and neoliberal strategists foresaw, for instance, that radicalized democracy would demand global reach. To forestall global realization of the left alternative, the right, liberals, and neoliberals increased their investment and other capital in sustaining capitalism. They at times speak of their efforts as a “conservative revolution,” “becoming great again,” and even fighting for the “common” or ordinary man. Given the financial support the right received from plutocrats across the globe since the 1960s, their moments of success reveal a basic fact: historically leftwing tactics plus funding equals success. The right of center and far right managed an important intellectual coup. They capitalized on the language of power and the global to the point of foreclosing the left’s willingness to see how such concepts are crucial to their future. Privatization and globalization became bedfellows on the right, for instance, which the left bought into and thus consigned public models to the local and the vulnerable. Yet a moment’s reflection would reveal a lost opportunity from the late 1960s, in which a public-oriented globalism was not only an aspiration of leftwing leadership but also a hope of everyday people. A globalized public could, after all, demand so-called “entitlements” for all. Where could capital undermine labor under such circumstances? For a time, the organization of power was moving in the direction of a series of large federal unions across the globe. Coalitions across Europe, others linking Africa, Western Asia, and South America, and possibilities for East Asia through the Pacific conglomerations of countries, would have led to the inevitable question: Why don’t four large units conjoin into two, and then eventually why don’t the remaining two work together? This imagined global coalition would render certain institutions obsolete. Would national borders make sense? Would the notion of top-down power models of presidents, legislatures, and constituents make sense instead of, as Benjamin Barber and many mayors of municipalities have considered, a bottom-up model of localities leading to regional committees on up to global committees? Instead of a “world president,” why not rotating committees through which concerns such as ecological laws would be global instead of tentative and selective? How about labor? Wouldn’t such a shift, where labor could migrate easily wherever there is work, entail the erosion of Capital and instead another model where the goal is to retain labor? And more, given the global scale of imaginative re-organizing, couldn’t there be a mixed economic situation in recognition of the inability of one economic model fitting all everywhere? These are acts of the imagination with possible transformation into action that globalized privatization aims to preclude. In concrete political terms, the U.S. efforts to break up large federal and cooperative alliances in places such as Eastern Europe, West Asia through South America — think particularly of what is happening in Brazil and Venezuela — have come home to roost as China and Russia are now doing the same against the European Union and the United States, in addition to their ongoing efforts in countries of Africa and the rest of Asia. Their efforts, however, are not linked to the humanistic global aspirations of the past but instead the lessons of acquiring naked power for the interests of disempowering political life through placing it under the yoke of rule. Our species faces today, then, an extraordinary tension of two kinds of globalism — the prevailing one, premised on growing authoritarian rule; the submerged alternative, harkening for substantive democracy or, in a word, political life Physically, our planet is the same size since walking upright and speaking transformed hominid into Homo sapiens. The lived-reality, however, is different. Through technology and biological reproduction, human beings have created a smaller planet with accelerated time. It is smaller because there are several billion of us. It is also smaller because of a basic insight from physics: our ability to go across vast distances in shorter time has transformed our lived reality of space. To remain gripped in conceptions of what it means to be human and how to organize power developed in past ages is now our liability. We need models of addressing questions indigenous to the world in which contemporary human beings live with sensitivity to their transformation for those who must build on what we produce. To take on such a challenge, we face the call for action without foreknowledge. To illustrate, think of the often-emerging fear of failure. How do we know if we will succeed? What can we do? On this matter, it is important for us to think of those who preceded us in what appeared to them to be impossible struggles. Think of people who faced the encompassing wrath of forces of conquest, colonization, enslavement, and genocide from the fifteenth-century onward that promised them, at every step of their struggles, that they would fail. They were, as far as all the evidence suggested, the end of the line. They had no future. They were promised there would be no, rolling down the corridors of history, us. Yet here many of us are. The existential and political question is this: Why did they act? Too many critics of action assess failure on the basis of an individual person or single generation. What they ignore is that action emerges in human systems, which means that each effort of suppression represents a transformation of a system’s focus from one element or practice to another. What this means is that each generation faces a different set of relations to a social problem, especially where previous generations acted and thus shifted what social systems do. A political act, then, unfolds over time and across generations. Why, then, did they act? There is existential paradox here. They acted through transcending themselves. They had no way of knowing exactly who we — their descendants — are, and in some cases, they may even disapprove of us. Yet, our existence is premised on their actions. The actions our ancestors waged against degradation, then, must have been premised on commitment instead of expected outcome. This is the core of political responsibility. Political commitment defies ordinary models of action. Consider acting for love. Old models of love require imagining the beloved as an extension of the self. One’s beloved is similar to oneself, and the logic makes this an expression of self-love. Yet anyone who knows people can see error here. People, after all, have the ability to love those who are not like them, just as we also have the capacity to hate most intensely those who are like us. Love, in other words, is not only premised on similarity but also possible through difference. There are different kinds of love. Political love is an expression of the latter. It requires acting for the sake of those or things other than the self. This observation about political commitment, love, and action points to a revolutionary insight from freedom fighters over the ages. To act from commitment defies imitation, as Fanon showed so well in his biting critique of the postcolonial bourgeoisie of many former colonies across the global south in Les Damnés de la terre. It requires full expectation that subsequent generations receive the gift of not having to be like “us.” Given the bleak contemporary situation of lunatics trying to make one imperial country “great again,” kleptocrats in another trying to destroy any hope in democracy, and a well-ordered authoritarian power in a third adopting state-capitalist and racial supremacist models of the first, the identification of the problems is also a demand for action for the sake of what transcends us. Those actions, should the rest of us inaugurate them, could mean change for the better, so long as, of course, we still have time.

#### Their framing of whiteness as inevitable is fatalist.

Lewis R. Gordon 18 [Professor of Philosophy and Africana Studies at the University of Connecticut. “Thoughts on two recent decades of studying race and racism”, *Social Identities*, Vol. 24, No. 1] //kd

The problem with addressing a problem in terms of bad faith is that its exemplars would immediately seek to defend themselves. Bad faith, as many who have studied the phenomenon know, is ashamed of itself and thus attempts to hide from itself often through shifting the orientation of critique (Gordon, 1995/1999; Sartre, 1943). Thus, the defense is on the alert for analyses of bad faith to be in bad faith. Much of this has to do with the negative associations of the word ‘bad’ and the legalistic meaning of ‘bad faith’ in the English language. Thus, I prefer simply to use the French term mauvaise-foi. Mauvaise-foi has its negative connotations in French, but its range is broader in usage than in English, just as Geist in German doesn’t exactly mean ‘spirit’ or ‘mind’ as it is often translated into English. The aforementioned list of hegemonic theorists of the study of race and gender in the mid-1990s reflects the domination of three approaches: (1) poststructuralism, (2) Marxism, and (3) liberal political theory primarily in the form of analytical political philosophy. Existentialism and phenomenology were not only being treated as passé but also as incompatible with each other. There was also the problem of ‘compartmentalism’ and ‘disciplinary decadence’, two tendencies that continue to be features of not only much race theory but also most disciplinary practices in the academy. The former offered disciplines under a separate but equal rule, which, if history has taught us anything about such formulations, is never actually so. The latter sought methodological conquest. These constrained what one could talk about when it came to human matters and how one is supposed to do it. I eventually developed a formulation of the second: ‘methodological fetishism’ (Gordon, 2016). Poststructuralism, Marxism, and analytical philosophy in the form of liberal political philosophy exemplified this tendency. One could add continental philosophy to this, which was in fact another way of saying ‘Euro-continental philosophy’. It, however, became, and for the most part continues to be, dominated by poststructualism and, relatedly, hermeneutics or theories of interpretation. A form of cart before the horse was the result, where fetishized methods were being imposed on reality instead of constructing relationships with it. As should be apparent at this point, disciplinary decadence is a form of mauvaise-foi (Gordon, 2006, 2012, 2016). The similarity to Sartre’s famous formulation of the fallacy of placing essence before existence in the study of human reality also comes to the fore (Sartre, 1943, 1946). This is particularly ironic with regard to poststructuralism since its approach is patently anti-essentialist (Caws, 1992; Gordon, 2012). Mauvaise-foi emerged not only at the level of human phenomena in action but also at the ways in which they are studied. For instance, the compartmentalist approach of separating race away from other dimensions of human reality distorts the subject at hand. It could only be done, ultimately, in mauvaise-foi because of the imposition of non-relationality on a relational subject (Gordon, 2010, 2016). The old debate of race versus gender, or race versus class, or gender versus class, and any of these versus sexual orientation is a fine intellectual exercise under laboratory conditions in which the domain of inquiry is staked out and constrained. That, however, is not human reality. Typically, we (human beings) don’t ‘see’ race, gender, class, or sexual orientation walking around; we exemplify, coextensively, all of these, all the time, in different ways. Imagine the hyphenated version class-gender-race-sexuality (and more) with emphasis on different words at different times. Focus is not identical with elimination. Race for me, then, was and continues to be studied in relation to what made it, among other related phenomena, emerge as a reality of human life over the past several hundred years (Gordon, 1995/1999, 1995, 2006, 2010). There is a simple version of my argument from those years: Racism requires denying the humanity of other groups of human beings through the organization of them, through regimes of power, under the category of a race and then denying the ascription of human being to them. The performative contradiction is that they would first have to be identified as human beings in order to deny their being such. It is thus a form of mauvaise-foi. Since racism is a form of mauvaise-foi, antiblack racism, as a species of racism, must also be a form of mauvaise-foi. My seemingly simple argument had complicated theoretical consequences. How did such performative contradictions historically emerge? People were not always categorized under races. Gender and linguistic membership predated many racial concepts (Gordon, 1997). Many other examples, such as religious membership, location in an economy, and even specialized skills could be added to the mix. One approach is to look at the concepts informing dehumanization. They depend on a particular idea of human beings at work in racist practices. An obvious feature of racism is the rejection of having relationships with members of certain races. Non-relationality has many implications. For one, the notion that one could exist without relations with others (a slippery slope leading to being without relations) requires a model of the self as self-sustaining ‘substance’. That model has dominated much of market-oriented Euromodern thought, especially those in the Anglophone world. My writings could be read as a critique of this notion. Consider any act of studying a phenomenon. Such an effort cannot be done without establishing at least a relationship with something as a focus of study. This doesn’t involve eliminating one’s relationship to reality but instead reorienting oneself to relevant acts of knowing, learning, and understanding (Gordon, 1995, 2010, 2012, 2016). Commitment to the elimination of relations leads to contradictions. Try, for instance, eliminating relations to oneself. Mauvaise foi returns in many forms as each displeasing truth about relations is denied for the sake of pleasing falsehoods. In the chain of efforts, other important elements of study such as communicability, evidence, and sociality come to the fore, each of which raises concerns of the self as other. As I focused primarily on antiblack racism, the question of whether all other forms of racism are the same emerged. Blackness functions, after all, in peculiar ways in societies that have produced antiblack racism. A response to the #BlackLivesMatter movement, for instance, is often that ‘all lives matter’. That is true the extent to which each group lives under conditions of equal respect for life. What advocates of #BlackLivesMatter are doing, however, is responding to a world in which some lives matter a lot more than others, whose lives evidentially matter a lot less. The history of antiblack racism amounts to the conviction that black people are only valuable the extent to which there is use for their labor or, worse, profiting from their misfortune as we see with the heavily racialized prison industrial complexes in the United States and similar countries (Alexander, 2010; Davis, 1983, 2005). It collapses into the expectation of justified existence in a context in which the justification for whoever stands as most valued is intrinsic. Members of the dominant group could thus seek their justification – if they wish – personally, through mechanisms of love, professional recognition, athletic achievement, etc. Moreover, that such society renders some groups as positive and others as negative leads to notions of legitimate presence (illegitimate absence) and absence (illegitimate presence). Should the analysis remain at white and black, the world would, however, appear more closed than it in fact is. For one, simply being born black would bar the possibility of any legitimate appearance. This is a position that has been taken by a growing group of theorists known as ‘Afropessimists’, for whom ‘black’ signifies absolute ‘social death’ (Sexton, 2010, 2011; Wilderson, 2007, 2008, 2009). It is, in other words, outside of relations. My objections to this view are many. For one, no human being is ‘really’ any of these things. Do blacks, for instance, suffer social death in relation to each other? The project of making people into such is one thing. The achievement of such is another. This is an observation Fanon also makes in his formulation of the zone of nonbeing and his critique of otherness in the study of race in Black Skin, White Masks, which I discuss at length my (Gordon, 2015) study, What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought. Fanon (1952) is critical of how otherness is interpreted in race theories and the study of race. The rejection of otherness ignores the fact that others are human beings. Racism emerges in attempts to deny that. Instead, it offers the zone of nonbeing, non-appearance as human beings. The racially dominant group presumes self-justified reality (license), which means it doesn’t call itself into question. And the designated racially inferior group? Lacking justification, their access to being is illegitimate. This means their absence is a mark of the system’s legitimacy. Such groups face the Catch 22 of illegitimate appearance: To appear is to violate appearance. Put differently, the violation is one of appearing without a license to do such. To all this, a consideration that should be added is this: The human being comes to the fore through emerging from being in the first place. Thus, the assertion of Being, as in the thought of Heidegger and his followers is also an effort to push the human being out of existence, so to speak. Heidegger, fair enough in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947/1971), saw no problem in this. Fanon (1952), and many others in Africana philosophy, including the South African philosopher and psychologist Noël Chabani Manganyi (1973, 1977), disagreed through showing how racial conflict is also an existential one in which an existential ontology is posed against an ontology of being. The latter, we submit, is best suited for gods. When such becomes the model of being human, humanity dies. Blacks thus face the paradox of existing (standing out, living – as ex sistere means such) as non-existence (not standing out). Antiblack racism makes black appearance illicit. Licit appearance would mean appearing as selves and others. It would mean the right to appear. Antiracist struggles will not work, then, as a struggle against otherness. It is, instead, against being non-selves and non-others. Returning to the Afropessmistic notion of blackness as social death, I’m compelled to ask: Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count as social perspectives? If the question of racism is a function of unequal power, which it clearly is, why not offer a study of power, how it is gained and lost, instead of an assertion of its manifestations as ontological? I’m reminded here of Victor Anderson’s (1995) Beyond Ontological Blackness. Anderson would no doubt object that Afropessimism treats ‘blackness’ as an ontological, which makes it a self-sustaining (non-relational) concept. The historical emergence of blackness refutes that. But more, there is a logical paradox that emerges from ontological blackness. To identify blackness, one must be in a relation to it. This relational matter requires looking beyond blackness ironically in order to understand blackness. This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, and fixed into the grammar of how meaning is produced. Consider the grammar of gender. Women historically occupy the role of absence (de Beauvoir, 1949; Butler, 2011; Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997). Blackness and womanness are thus intimate (Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997). The grammar of presence and absence is peculiarly theodicean (Gordon, 2010, 2013). This is the form of mauvaise-foi in which presence takes on the hubris of the desire to be a (often the) god. Theodicy defends the integrity of the god (systemic maintenance) through placing its contradictions (for example, evil) outside of it. The result is Being as a form of systemic purity (Monahan, 2011, 2017). This grammar is also psychoanalytical, in the sense of existential psychoanalysis. Manichean ‘qualities’ (such as ‘hard’ masculinity and ‘soft’ femininity) are evident in these modes of being. This pertains as well to sexual orientation: A white man’s relation to a black man is not only one of race-to-race but also of race-to-gender where the meaning of being black (as ‘feminine’ and ‘sexual’) could collapse into gendered absence. And extended to the sexualization of absence – think of the plethora of literature on the feminine as soft, cold, dark, and absence. The relation among males in which one group manifests such qualities immediately collapses into a homoerotic one (Fanon, 1952; Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997, 2000). We see here a conception of dealing with racial and gender qualities that are today called ‘intersectional’, though that metaphor doesn’t at first quite work for their existential phenomenological psychoanalytical manifestations in mauvaise-foi (because purity seeks singularity). The major proponent of intersectionality – Kimberlé Crenshaw – is pretty clear that she is referring to identity collisions as they appear in law (especially tort and discrimination law); in other words, she is referring to harms that, because of how they are interpreted, don’t appear (supposedly don’t exist) despite their lived-reality. She often illustrates her point through her famous example of a collision at a four-way intersection (Crenshaw, 1991, 2014). If the fundamental site of harm is property, the concern will be about the cars, and if their status of property depends on being owned by, say, white men, then harm would pertain to them. If the location of harm expands simply to ‘whites’, then a white woman or man in one of the cars would be sufficient for harm having occurred. If, however, there were no whites in the cars, then the conclusion would be that no one was harmed. If harm extends to blacks and other people of color, and even further, to non-human animals, then any of them being in the car or cars would initiate a cause for redress. Notice that Crenshaw’s argument doesn’t deny the possibility of white men being harmed. Her point is that people such as black women were not historically acknowledged in the legal frameworks of harmed subjects because of a failure to see that human beings do not manifest a single category of identity on which to build a legal response. Simply referring to ‘man’ as the exemplar of human being fails to acknowledge that human beings are not only men but also women, and simply as ‘women’ fails to address what kind of women such as those of color and different sexual orientations. At an existential level, what is also missed is the lived-reality of the convergence of these and their social and legal implications. A black woman in an automobile collision is, for example, not just harmed but also harmed in ways linked to the wider legal framework of the society. The criminalization of black women and men, for instance, could mean that though harmed in the collision, such people may face the possibility of entanglement in a legal system that treats them as the cause of harm, which could lead to other dangers such as ensnarement in the criminal justice system. This is one of the reasons why, even when harmed, many people of color don’t seek the aid of law enforcement and other representatives of that system. Crenshaw’s theory therefore has an existential and phenomenological significance in that it is an argument for the appearance of what is otherwise treated as either non-existent or not worthy of appearing, of, that is, illicit appearance. Her theory is also about the radicalization of appearance in that the identified subjects emerge, so to speak, not only in terms of being seen but also through an effort to see what they see or experience – in short, to see or at least understand their point of view in terms of the conditions they face. It is thus not a subjective theory or a narrowly objective one but instead an intersubjective theory because it requires understanding how different human beings relate to and encounter legal structures – products of the human world – as simultaneously alienating and enabling. Crenshaw’s concept of an intersection could, however, be interpreted in problematic ways. The first is the geometric model of an intersection. That version presupposes well-formed or complete lines converging. A response would be that there was never a complete ‘whole’ or, as the feminist phenomenological communicologist Sara Ahmed (2006) would put it, ‘straight line’ with regard to human subjects in the first place. The queer phenomenological theorist David Ross Fryer (2008), in stream with Ahmed, offers the logical conclusion of this critique – namely, a fundamental queerness at the heart of race theory and related areas of study such as gender studies and queer theory. My recent work in philosophy of culture extends such a concern to the human condition as well – that is, the upsurge from being makes human reality a queer one. This is pretty much the argument articulated earlier with regard to questions raised by Fanon’s analysis of ontology, existential ontology, and the dialectics of selves and others. The second critical consideration is that as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning, the question of identity requires more than an intersecting model, otherwise there will simply be one (a priori) normative outcome in every moment of inquiry: Whoever manifests the maximum manifestation of predetermined negative intersecting terms. That would in effect be an essence before an existence – indeed, before an actual event of harm. Some race theorists’ tendency to build their arguments on a particular group as ‘most oppressed’ without offering evidence for the continued truth of such a claim is an example of this fallacy. This observation emerges as well where pessimism is the guiding attitude. An existential critique would be that optimism and pessimism are symptomatic of the same attitude: a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental, which means that the social world at hand is a manifestation of choices and relationships – in other words, human actions. As human beings can only build the future instead of it determining us, the task at hand depends on commitment – what is to be done without guarantees of outcome. This concern also pertains to the initial concerns about authenticity. One could only be pessimistic about an outcome, an activity. It’s an act of forecasting what could only be meaningful once actually performed. Similarly, one could only be optimistic about the same. What, however, if there were no way to know either? Here we come to the foi element in mauvaise foi. Some actions are deontological, and if not that, they are at least reflections of our commitments, our projects. Thus, the point of some actions isn’t about their success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing (Fanon, 1961/ 1991; Gordon, 2015). Taking responsibility for such actions – bringing value to them – is opposed to another manifestation of mauvaise-foi: the spirit of seriousness.